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Developing a Methodology for Assessing Safety Programs
Targeting Human Error in Aviation
“I believe that the past is prologue.....In our recommendations we try to take what we have
learned and correct situations so it shouldn’t happen again.”
—Former National Transportation Safety Board Chairman James Hall (1996)

INTRODUCTION

any specific type of human error (Figure 1). That is to
say, the percentage of accidents associated with aircrew
error (i.e., skill-based errors, decision errors, perceptual
errors, and violations) has remained relatively stable
since 1990.
What this implies is that intervention strategies implemented in the 1990s have had, at best, ubiquitous effects
on the errors and violations committed by aircrew. More
likely, however, there has been no sustained impact of
any particular intervention program (Shappell, Detwiler,
Holcomb, Hackworth, Boquet, & Wiegmann, 2006).
The latter should come as no surprise, given that prior
to these FAA studies, no comprehensive analysis of aircrew and supervisory error had been conducted using a
human factors approach to accident causation. Not to
mention that there has been no systematic human factors
examination of the current or proposed safety programs
aimed at addressing human error.
But in some ways, that is putting the proverbial cart
before the horse. After all, while HFACS provided a
theoretically derived and validated framework for accident/incident investigation and analysis, a similar
framework did not exist that would allow the FAA and
other organizations to evaluate the potential benefits of
current and proposed human error intervention strategies.
So the better question may be whether a “human factors”
analysis of safety programs is even possible.

Indeed, the National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB), Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and
other safety organizations have committed extraordinary
resources to prevent civilian aviation accidents. As a result,
aviation in the U.S., particularly commercial aviation, has
become one of the safest modes of transportation. Still,
accidents can happen, often repeating the same sequence
of events played out many times before. As a result, we
are often left with the regrettable truth that there are
really very few “new” accidents, just different players.
Perhaps that is why Chairman Hall chose the operative
term “shouldn’t” rather than “won’t” in 1996.
So if there really are few “new” accidents, why has the
aviation accident rate remained relatively stable over the
last several years? After all, if we already know what the
problem is, why have we been unable to fix it? Perhaps
it has something to do with the current state of aviation
safety. Truth be told, the industry is extremely safe, and
the easy fixes have been identified and remedied. What
remains to be addressed is the small fraction of accidents
attributable to perhaps the most complex problem facing
aviation today – human error.
A closer examination of the current aviation accident
record has revealed that anywhere between 70-80% of
all aviation accidents are at least partially attributable to
human error (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). Therefore,
it stands to reason that, if quantifiable improvements
in aviation safety are to be realized, the primary focus
should be on the human operator (i.e., aircrew) and those
involved with the safe conduct of flight (e.g., mechanics, supervisors, air traffic controllers) rather than more
traditional areas like the aircraft itself.
With this in mind, the FAA has employed the
Human Factors Analysis and Classification System
(HFACS; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001, 2003; Shappell
& Wiegmann, 2003, 2004) to identify the human factors underlying both commercial and general aviation.
Principal among the FAA’s findings using HFACS was
the observation that, while previous safety programs may
have impacted other areas of aviation, there has been
little evidence that they have had a significant impact on

NASA Intervention Strategies
At least one study (Wiegmann & Rantanen, 2003)
suggests that such an analysis can be performed using a
set of standards derived from the same body of literature
used to develop HFACS. In their book, A Human Factors
Approach to Aviation Accidents, Wiegmann and Shappell
(2003) described an intervention taxonomy clustered
around four broad categories:
1. Environment (e.g., the control of temperature,
noise, vibration, lighting)
2. Human (personnel selection, incentives, training,
teamwork, communication, etc.)
3. Machine (engineering design, capacity, etc.)
4. Task (ordering/timing of events, procedures, standardization, etc.)


A.

Using this framework, Wiegmann and Rantanen
(2003) examined a variety of technologies developed by
NASA’s aviation safety program (AvSP). From energy
absorbing seats, restraints, and structures to synthetic
vision, each safety program was classified within one
of the four intervention categories. As shown in Figure
2, they concluded that NASA’s primary intervention
strategies targeted the machine rather than the human,
environment, or task. Two programs, Incident Reporting Enhancement Tools and Fast-time Simulation of
System-wide Risks, were considered unclassifiable by
the raters using these categories.
In a separate part of their study, Wiegmann & Rantanen (2003) examined the NASA technologies using
the HFACS framework. Surprisingly, it was determined
that nearly half of the technologies that NASA was
developing were rated as having no impact on aircrew
error. What’s more, those that might have an impact
primarily targeted decision errors, by providing better
information, automation, and training. An even smaller
percentage of the technologies targeted aircrew error, in
general, and only one of the products primarily targeted
skill-based errors – the most frequent human error facing both commercial and general aviation. None of the
products primarily targeted violations, another area of
concern within civilian aviation operations.
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Purpose
Clearly, if improvements in safety are to be realized, a more systematic methodology is needed for
generating intervention/prevention strategies that can
tie into human error frameworks like HFACS. Such a
methodology would help ensure that factors affecting
human performance are addressed at multiple levels
and from multiple directions, thereby facilitating the
development of effective intervention strategies rather
than a single, narrowly focused design fix.
This report describes two studies that build upon
the methodology originally described by Wiegmann
and Shappell (2003) and used by Wiegmann and
Rantanen (2003) with NASA safety programs. The
first study describes an independent validation of the
four intervention methodologies using safety recommendations from the NTSB. The second describes the
examination of proposed FAA aviation safety programs
using a prototype intervention matrix that maps the
unsafe acts of operators (i.e., skill-based errors, decision
errors, perceptual errors, and violations) onto several
intervention approaches.
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Figure 1. Percentage of unsafe acts committed by
aircrew during general aviation (Panel A) commuter (Panel B) and air carrier (Panel C) operations
by year. Note that percentages will not add up to
100% due to multiple causal factors associated
with most accidents.
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Figure 2. Percentage of NASA safety programs
within each intervention category.


STUDY 1: Analysis of NTSB
Recommendations

those cases, the original recommendation was separated
into sub-recommendations while preserving the intent of
the NTSB. This resulted in a revised list of 872 unique
recommendations for further analysis.

Investigating accidents, identifying potential interventions, and issuing safety recommendations are central to
any safety program and as such are a major function of
local, state, and federal safety boards. Indeed, one such
national entity, the NTSB, cites safety recommendations
as “… the most important part of [their] mandate…”
(NTSB, 2002).
Ideally, safety recommendations, when adopted by
cognizant organizations, will positively influence future
operations in the field and thereby improve overall system safety. However, recommendations are just that …
recommendations and, as such, are not always adopted.
Moreover, they are often based solely on isolated events
or at best a few events over a very short period of time
rather than more global analyses of the system as a whole.
While these interventions may solve a local or single-point
problem, they often do not have far-reaching impact.
Further complicating matters, many domains such
as aviation and their corresponding safety boards have
traditionally strong relations with quantitative disciplines
like engineering and physics. Consequently, while these
organizations may be especially adept at dealing with
mechanical issues, they tend to be less robust when
dealing with organizational or human-centered aspects
of accidents like human error, organizational failure,
communication, and risk assessment (Stoop, 2002).
Recognizing this, the NTSB, like many safety entities,
has integrated human factors experts into their organization, presumably leading to recommendations that address the entire system rather than a single engineering or
mechanical aspect, per se. However, employing human
factors experts alone does not necessarily translate into
a breadth of interventions. The question remains, what
specific intervention approaches does the NTSB employ?
In other words, does the NTSB tend to be uni-dimensional (like NASA) or multi-dimensional with regard to
specific intervention approaches?

Clustering Process
The recommendations were independently clustered
into categories by two analysts (one with a doctoral-level
background in psychology, the other with a graduate
background in engineering) based on their similarities.
The analysts were not instructed to use any predefined
taxonomy or classification scheme. They were simply
instructed to independently assign each recommendation
to categories of their choosing, based upon the nature of
the recommendation.
Not surprising, given the vagueness of the instructions,
there were some differences in the terms used by the two
analysts, but there were also strong similarities. Wherever
disagreements occurred, the analysts were asked to discuss
their clustering heuristic and to agree on a single classification scheme. In the end, all 872 recommendations
were classified based on their underlying similarities by
two independent analysts, who later came to a consensus
on the number and labels for each of these clusters.
Results
Ultimately, the analysts generated nine unique categories of recommendations, which included the design
of parts/displays, procedures, communication, training,
requests to conduct focused studies, rules, manuals,
inspection, and human resources. These nine categories
were then further clustered into four larger categories
based on their similarities: 1) administrative/organizational; 2) mechanical/ engineering; 3) human/crew; and
4) task/mission. Each category and their accompanying
subcategories are briefly described in Table 1.
Distribution of recommendations
On average, roughly six recommendations spread
across just under three (2.8) intervention subcategories
were observed per accident. The actual distribution of
recommendations across the intervention categories and
subcategories is presented in Table 2.
From a global perspective, it appears that roughly
two-thirds of the recommendations were either administrative/organizational or mechanical/ engineering fixes.
However, nearly a quarter of the recommendations were
aimed at either the task or mission.
Surprisingly few interventions directly targeted operators (aircrew), even though previous studies repeatedly
show that more major accidents have been attributed to
human error than to any other single cause (Wiegmann
& Shappell, 2003; Boquet et al., in review; Detwiler et al.,

Method
NTSB Safety Recommendations
To examine this question, aviation safety recommendations associated with commercial (14 CFR Part 121
– air carrier and Part 135 – commuter) aviation accidents
occurring between 1998 and 2004 were obtained from
the NTSB’s official Website (www.ntsb.gov). Of the
147 commercial aviation accidents reports that were
completed at the time of this study, 622 unique safety
recommendations were identified. However, several of the
recommendations consisted of compound solutions. In


Table 1. Proposed categories and subcategories of NTSB recommendations.

Table 2. Percentage of recommendations
associated with each intervention category.

Administrative/Organizational
Rules/Regulations/Policies: Issuing, modifying,
establishing, amending, and/or reviewing
policies, rules, or regulations.
Information Management/ Communication:
Improvements in disseminating, storing,
archiving and publishing information. Also
included are recommendations regarding
collecting data; issuing information bulletins,
advisory circulars, and reporting activity.
Research/ Special Study: Conducting research to
determine the impact of recent technological
advances or call for special studies to review
processes, develop/validate methodologies,
evaluate the feasibility of safety equipment,
and/or conduct surveys.
Human Resource Management: Adequacy of
staff in specific situations, the need for additional
personnel, and the evaluation of individual skills
of employees.

Intervention Category
Administrative/Organizational
Rules/Regulations/Policies
Information management/ Comm.
Research/Special study
Human resource management
Mechanical/Engineering
Design/Repair
Inspection
Human/Crew
Training
Task/Mission
Procedures
Manuals

%
34.18
9.29
13.76
10.44
0.69
31.20
23.17
8.03
11.47
11.47
23.16
14.56
8.60

n
81
120
91
6
202
70
100
127
75

(23.17%) - nearly twice as many as any other category.
Considerably fewer were aimed at procedures, training,
information management/ communication, and the
other subcategories.

Mechanical/Engineering
Design/Repair: Specific manufacturing changes
including the design of parts. Also included is
the modification, replacement, removal and/or
installation, or repair of parts and equipment.
Inspection: Maintenance inspections,
overhauling, detecting damage, including day-today operations such as inspecting fuel, oil level,
and recommended safety checks.

Summary
To date, there have been few attempts to systematically study recommendations generated by investigative
organizations like the NTSB. This is unfortunate, because
the results of such studies may help in understanding
why accident rates have stabilized over the last several
decades and could lead to the development of more effective intervention strategies. For example, in this study
alone there were four broad categories of interventions
identified, comprising nine unique categories of recommendations.
When examining the breadth and scope of NTSB recommendations, even at this level, it appears that current
safety recommendations in aviation tend to focus more
on improving the design of systems or some manner of
organizational change rather than focusing on operational
personnel. While these recommendations are obviously
well-intentioned and often specific to a particular accident,
they may be misplaced or too narrow in scope. This may
help explain why the percentage of accidents associated
with human error has not changed over the last 15 years
(Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003; Wiegmann et al., 2005;
Shappell et al., in press).
This is not to say that the design of new technology
will not have a significant impact on how people perform.
After all, advances in aviation technology and engineering
have accounted for marked reductions in the aviation
accident rate since the late 1950s. On the other hand,
some of these advances have led to new, occasionally

Human / Crew
Training: Reviewing, developing, and
implementing training programs. Also included
is the training of personnel in handling
emergencies.
Task/Mission
Procedures: Amending, reviewing, modifying,
revising, establishing, developing, and validating
procedures.
Manuals: Reviewing, revising, issuing,
amending, and modifying manuals, bulletins,
checklists, and other instructions or guidance.

2006; Shappell et al., in press). It has also been observed
that wider systemic issues, including the managerial
and regulatory context of aviation operations, were also
mentioned in a large number of reports (Holloway &
Johnson, 2004; Johnson, in review), even though this
does not seem to be reflected in the accident record.
A closer examination revealed that, similar to Wiegmann and Rantanen’s study of NASA safety programs,
design fixes constituted the largest percentage of any
individual type of recommendation made by the NTSB


Human Factors Analysis and Classification System
Such an error framework already exists and is widely
used within the aviation industry. This framework,
the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System
(HFACS), describes two general categories of unsafe
acts that operators commit: errors – the honest mistakes
individuals make every day, and violations – the willful
disregard for the rules and regulations of safety. Within
those two overarching categories, HFACS describes three
types of errors (decision, skill-based, and perceptual) and
two types of violations (routine and exceptional). Each
is briefly described below.

catastrophic, errors (e.g., autopilot-mode errors, Sarter
& Woods, 1992; 1994). What appears to be required is
a broader, systematic approach to accident intervention,
particularly if we are to effectively address human error
within aviation operations. But how can this be done?
To ensure that safety professionals generate effective
intervention strategies, rather than a single “knee jerk”
fix to a problem, knowledge of all viable interventions is
required. Towards these ends, the present study suggests
that there are at least four broad categories of interventions that appear tenable within the aviation industry.
These are Administrative/Organizational, Human/Crew,
Mechanical/Engineering, and Task/Procedure.
These four approaches differed slightly from those
previously proposed by Wiegmann and Shappell (2003)
and utilized by Wiegmann and Rantanen (2003) to analyze NASA safety programs. One category that naturally
surfaced from the present analysis, but was missing from
the Wiegmann and Rantanen study, was Administrative/Organizational interventions. In contrast, “environmental” interventions did not appear in the current
study but were present in the NASA study (Wiegmann
& Rantanen, 2003).
In the end, the question is not whether or not there
are three, four, five, or more approaches to identifying
potential accident interventions as much as there is definitively more than one. Exactly what those approaches
are remains to be fully explored. However, the five approaches identified between the present study and the
investigation conducted by Wiegmann and Rantanen
(2003) is a reasonable first start.

Errors
One of the more common error forms, decision errors, represents conscious, goal-intended behavior that
proceeds as designed, yet the plan proves inadequate or
inappropriate for the situation. Often referred to as “honest
mistakes,” these unsafe acts typically manifest as poorly
executed procedures, improper choices, or simply the
misinterpretation or misuse of relevant information.
In contrast to decision errors, the second error form,
skill-based errors, occurs with little or no conscious thought.
Just as little thought goes into turning one’s steering wheel
or shifting gears in an automobile, basic flight skills such
as stick and rudder movements and visual scanning often
occur without thinking. The difficulty with these highly
practiced and seemingly automatic behaviors is that they
are particularly susceptible to attention and/or memory
failures. As a result, skill-based errors such as the breakdown in visual scan patterns, inadvertent activation/deactivation of switches, forgotten intentions, and omitted
items in checklists often appear. Even the manner in (or
skill) which one flies an aircraft (aggressive, tentative, or
controlled) can affect safety.
While decision and skill-based errors have dominated most accident databases and have, therefore, been
included in most error frameworks, the third and final
error form, perceptual errors, has received comparatively
less attention. No less important, perceptual errors occur
when sensory input is degraded, or “unusual,” as is often
the case when flying at night, in the weather, or in other
visually impoverished environments. Faced with acting
on imperfect or incomplete information, aircrews run
the risk of misjudging distances, altitude, and decent
rates, as well as responding incorrectly to a variety of
visual/vestibular illusions.

STUDY 2: HFIX Analysis of JSAT/
JSIT Recommendations
Identifying viable approaches for intervening, however,
is only the first step. The ability to map interventions onto
specific types of human error is also vitally important.
In other words, simply generating a variety of interventions across several domains, whether they are human,
mechanical, environmental, and so on, is likely to be
ineffective unless such interventions directly target the
problem area.
Given that human error continues to be the largest
contributor to commercial and general aviation accidents,
it makes sense to map different interventions against
specific error forms. What is needed is a theoretical framework that captures the underlying causal mechanisms
of human error along with the intervention approaches
identified in Study 1.

A complete description of the entire HFACS framework, including
all 4 tiers and 19 causal categories, can be found in Wiegmann and
Shappell, 2003.




Violations
Although there are many ways to distinguish among
types of violations, two distinct types have been identified based on their etiology. Routine violations tend to be
habitual by nature and are often enabled by a system of
supervision and management that tolerates such departures from the rules (Reason, 1990). Often referred to
as “bending the rules,” the classic example is that of the
individual who drives his/her automobile consistently 510 mph faster than allowed by law. While clearly against
the law, the behavior is, in effect, sanctioned by local
authorities (police) who often will not enforce the law
until speeds in excess of 10 mph over the posted limit
are observed.
Exceptional violations, on the other hand, are isolated
departures from authority, neither typical of the individual
nor condoned by management. For example, while driving
65 in a 55 mph zone might be condoned by authorities,
driving 105 mph in a 55 mph zone certainly would not.
It is important to note that while most exceptional violations are appalling, they are not considered “exceptional”
because of their extreme nature. Rather, they are regarded
as exceptional because they are neither typical of the
individual nor condoned by authority.

tive interventions onto the matrix, it would be readily
apparent if the scope of a proposed program was uni- or
multi-dimensional.
Alternatively, a framework like HFIX could be used
proactively to determine which areas an organization has
“covered” and where gaps exist in the current safety program given current trends in the error data. For instance,
if you knew that the largest threat to safety within your
organization was skill-based errors, followed by decision
errors, violations, and perceptual errors (as is the case
with general and commercial aviation in the U.S.), HFIX
could be used to determine if your proposed and future
interventions have the potential to address those needs
and which areas are currently being targeted.
Hence, the purpose of Study 2 was to determine if
such an approach could be used within the FAA and
which types of human error might be affected by current
and future interventions. In a sense, this analysis would
provide a “benchmark” of current FAA intervention efforts. When combined with existing HFACS data (e.g.,
Shappell et al., in press; Detwiler et al., 2006; Wiegmann
et al., 2005) possible gaps, if any, may be identified.
FAA Safer Skies Initiative
As part of the FAA’s Safer Skies initiative, three teams
of experts from government, employee advocacy groups
(e.g., the National Air Traffic Controllers Association),
the aviation industry, and academia were formed to address civilian aviation accidents. Two of those teams, the
Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST) and General
Aviation Joint Steering Committee (GA JSC), were formed
to address specific threats to commercial and general
aviation, respectively.
With the CAST and the GA JSC providing oversight,
three working groups were formed: 1) Joint Safety Analysis
Teams (JSATs), 2) Joint Safety Implementation Teams
(JSITs), and 3) Joint Implementation Monitoring Teams
(JIMTs). Particularly germane to this study were outcomes
derived from the JSAT and JSIT working groups since
they represented current and future interventions necessary to address human error associated with commercial
and general aviation accidents. In particular, this study
was interested in the recommendations from JSAT/JSIT
teams examining accidents associated with:
• Controlled flight into terrain
• Approach and landing
• Loss of control
• Runway incursions
• Weather
• Pilot decision-making

Human Factors Intervention Matrix (HFIX)
A prototype matrix, called the Human Factors Intervention Matrix (HFIX), pits the unsafe acts individuals
commit against the five different intervention approaches
presented in Figure 3. The utility of such a framework
seems intuitive. For example, if one were interested in
developing interventions to address decision errors, the
goal would be to identify prospective interventions within
each approach (i.e., organizational/administrative, human/crew, etc.), thereby ensuring that the widest array
of interventions were considered. By mapping prospec-
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Task/
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Figure 3. The “Human Factors Intervention
matriX” (HFIX).


Method

Results

JSAT and JSIT Recommendations
JSAT and JSIT reports were collected from each
CAST and GA JSC committee by researchers at the
Civil Aerospace Medical Institute. After eliminating
duplicate recommendations, a comprehensive list was
compiled electronically for classification. The final list
of 614 unique recommendations was then randomized
to reduce bias.

The results of both classification tasks are presented
in Figure 4. Several observations can be made from the
data. First, as with the NTSB recommendations, a large
percentage (36.6%) of the JSAT/JSIT recommendations
were directed at organizational/administrative levels. Likewise, several (22.2%) of the recommendations involved
technological/engineering approaches. However, unlike
the NTSB where relatively few recommendations targeted
the human, nearly one-third of those obtained from the
JSAT/JSITs did so. This may be because, unlike the NTSB
recommendations, we selectively chose those JSAT/JSIT
reports that addressed human error issues like pilot decision-making and runway incursions. In that sense, the
JSAT/JSIT data were much more homogenous (i.e., they
did not contain non-human related accidents) and the proposed interventions may simply reflect that inherent bias.
However, if that were true, one might actually expect that
an even larger percentage of the recommendations would
target the human/crew than was actually observed.
When examining the HFACS classifications, remember
that, unlike the specific approaches to accident interventions where subjects were instructed to select only one
approach, they were permitted to select all of the HFACS
Unsafe Act categories that they felt would be impacted by
a given recommendation. Therefore, unlike the intervention approaches whose percentages added up to 100%,
the total percentages associated with each Unsafe Act
category did not.
Perhaps not unexpected, interventions aimed at decision errors were associated with nearly three out of every
four JSAT/JSIT recommendations examined. In contrast,
skill-based errors were associated with roughly 50% of
the recommendations followed by perceptual errors
(37.6%) and violations (26.9%). Of note, these numbers
are slightly different than the percentage of accidents associated with each type of error where skill-based errors
account for between 45-80% of the accidents, depending
on whether one is talking about commercial or general
aviation, respectively (see Figure 1). Likewise, roughly 1/3
of the accidents were associated with decision errors, yet
72.6% of the interventions have some component that
will potentially affect pilot decision-making.
This is not to say that there should be a one-to-one
relationship between the percentage of accidents associated with a given error category and the percentage
of recommendations aimed at addressing these errors.
After all, it may take more effort to address one error
form than another, or more interventions may naturally
address pilot decision-making. In either case, the global
analysis presented here suggests that additional review of
this apparent incongruity is necessary.

Categorization of the Data
Eighteen Master of Aeronautical Science candidates
were recruited from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University for Study 2. Each had experience in the aviation community as either a pilot, maintainer, or at an administrative
level, and all had successfully completed a minimum of
one graduate-level human factors course.
After a roughly 4-hour training session on the HFACS
and HFIX frameworks, subjects were randomly assigned
to one of six groups. Each 3-person team was then randomly assigned roughly one-sixth of the recommendations to classify.
Each team member was instructed to independently
classify each recommendation into only one of the five
intervention approaches (i.e., organizational/ administrative, human/crew, mechanical/engineering, task/mission, or physical environment). In addition, they were
instructed to identify any HFACS Unsafe Acts categories
they felt the intervention would impact.
After the initial rating, team members were permitted to discuss their classification within their group to
resolve any differences. A final, consensus classification
for each recommendation was then provided for further
analysis.
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Figure 4. Percentage of JSAT/JSIT recommendations classified by intervention approach
and specific HFACS Unsafe Act addressed.


Perhaps more important, however, was the mapping of
each intervention within both the intervention approach
and the HFACS Unsafe Acts category (Figure 4). As can
be seen (white boxes), three of the 20 possible boxes (organizational/ administrative by decision error, human/crew
by decision error, and human/crew by skill-based error)
contained 20% or more of the JSAT/JSIT interventions.
On the surface, this appears to reflect a narrow rather
that a broad approach to accident intervention/mitigation by these committees. It is not that the interventions
contained within these categories will not be effective,
just that other, potentially equally viable, interventions
may have been overlooked.
It is interesting to note, however, that if one examines
those boxes that contained between 10-20% of the possible
interventions, nearly all of the remaining boxes among
the organizational/ administrative, human/crew, and
technology/ engineering approaches are included. What
was not accounted for were human/crew and technology/engineering approaches dealing with violations of the
rules and regulations. Obviously, these approaches might
prove beneficial if an organization wanted to modify or
curtail a particular unsafe pattern of behavior (e.g., flight
into instrument conditions while on a visual flight rules
flight plan) through training or technological means.
More notable was the general lack of interventions
targeting the specific task/mission of the aircrews or the
environment they are faced with. Perhaps a closer examination of the operations these aircrews are engaged in or the
environments they are expected to operate in is warranted.
In any event, there may have been options along these lines
that were not considered by these select committees.

commercial and general aviation. At least on the surface,
it appears that there are gaps in the safety program that
should be addressed.
For example, there was an apparent bias toward interventions aimed at pilot decision-making, particularly those
utilizing organizational and human approaches. While this
is not inherently bad, previous HFACS analyses suggest
that additional effort should be placed on skill-based errors
and violations, two areas that appear underrepresented,
given current trends in the accident data.
Also noteworthy, few interventions attempted to
modify/change the task itself or the environment. A
closer examination of the actual types of errors may
suggest changes in routes people fly or the actual type of
flights being flown.
However, while HFIX may prove useful when generating comprehensive intervention strategies, organizations
simply cannot implement every recommendation. Other
factors may need to be considered before employing
a given intervention. Factors such as effectiveness (i.e.,
what is the likelihood that it will work?), cost (i.e., can
the organization afford the intervention?), feasibility
(i.e., how easy will the intervention be to implement
or does it actually exist?), and acceptability (i.e., will the
workforce accept the proposed intervention?) all must
be considered.
As such, HFIX may actually be HFIX3 mapping human
error against the intervention approaches and evaluations
criteria (Figure 5). Although it may appear complex, in
reality organizational decision makers utilize this third
dimension all the time. To apply it to the two-dimensional HFIX framework is really not that great a leap.
However, even without this third dimension, the mapping
of specific interventions onto a matrix that combines the
five intervention approaches with general categories of
human error can provide a broader perspective of the
FAA’s safety programs.

Summary
Ideally, tools such as HFIX provide a Gestalt of the
safety program as a whole rather than an item-by-item
accounting of each intervention in an organization. After
all, it is hard to know if pieces are missing in a puzzle until
you put them together. HFIX allows administrators and
safety managers to put the intervention pieces together
in such a way that they can get a “quick look” at the
strengths and weaknesses of their programs. Additionally,
it provides decision makers within an organization the
ability to ensure that a broad spectrum of interventions
has been considered. After all, only the most elementary
of puzzles is comprised of just a few pieces; obviously,
something as complex as human error in aviation will
consist of a number of pieces.
That being said, the results from Study 2 using
JSAT/JSIT interventions, although clearly more multidimensional than NASA’s safety programs, still did not
appear to fully address the current accident trends in
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Figure 5. The HFIX3 framework.
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